THE BIOLOGICAL-ENVIROMENTAL DETERMINATION IN A MORAL CONTEXT OF ACTION: A COMPATIBILIST APPROACH

Abstract

The first part of this paper is devoted to Frank’s thesis (1988) according to which the evolution of moral sentiments and their presence in decision-making explains the presence of non-opportunistic behavior and its wide spread. I am interested in introducing Frank’s thesis in this paper, because there is argued that the outcome of certain biological mechanisms are, ultimately, actions that we (humans) characterize as moral actions; specifically those that we relate to our commitments with sincerity and honesty. The second part of the paper is devoted mainly to discuss the potential role of reason in decision-making in a context of moral action (CMA). This paper aims to argue in favor of the biological-environmental determinism in a CMA, since if an explanation of why a certain choice is made rationally is expressed satisfactorily in evolutionary terms, such explanation leaves room for the possibility that the choice is, somehow, previously programmed.