Metaphysics and Meaning in Wittgenstein's Tractatus

Abstract

In statement 6.54 of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein casts the grounds (the well-known metaphor of the stairs) on which certain porpositions are considered absurd and the concept of meaning is determined as a figurative expression of language. But if we throw away the stairs, we throw away the basis for discerning what is absurd. The first part of this paper attempts to address this problem, while the second part presents two readings (Diamond and Conant, on the one hand, and Hacker, on the other), which are alternatives for overcoming this problem and which, even so, have difficulties. For this reason, a third reading is proposed which aims to vindicate the role of metaphysics in Wittgenstein's thought. Such a reading allows us to think in a broader sense than the one proposed in the Tractatus, in a metaphorical sense that language constructs as images and that functions in the field of ethics.